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I. INTRODUCTION: THE TALE OF STEWART, RICOH, AND CAROL
In the early 1980s, a successful and ambitious Alabama
businessman named Walter H. Stewart purchased a failing local
copying business. Through the Stewart Organization, a corporation he
controlled, Stewart sought to steer this troubled business to the realm
of profitability. To do so, he entered into a dealership contract with
Ricoh Corporation, a national manufacturer of copy machines that
conducted its operations in New York. Unfortunately, their
relationship soured. Stewart sued Ricoh in an Alabama federal district
court, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.1
Ricoh did not want to litigate in Alabama, and the original
dealership contract seemed to provide a way out. That contract
included a forum selection clause stating that any litigation arising
out of the agreement had to be filed in a state or federal court located
in Manhattan. 2 Ricoh had two basic options for attempting to enforce
this clause. It could move for the case to be transferred under the
federal transfer statute3 to the federal district court in Manhattan. 4
Alternatively, it could ask the court to enforce the clause by
dismissing the Alabama suit.5 Ricoh chose to do both, but the district
court, applying Alabama law to both motions, refused to enforce the
clause. 6 Ricoh preferred the application of federal law, which generally
1. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 644-45 (11th Cir. 1985).
2. The exact language of that clause was that "[A]ny appropriate state or federal district
court located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement...
Id. at 645 n.2.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
4. The federal transfer statute only allows transfer to another federal forum, so a New
York state court in Manhattan would not be a transfer option. See infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
5. After dismissal, Ricoh could file its own complaint (or await a complaint from the North
Carolina company) in either the federal or state court located in Manhattan. How exactly Ricoh
should identify this motion to dismiss is a major aspect of this Note. See infra Part II.B.
6. Stewart Org., 779 F.2d at 645.
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favored enforcing forum selection clauses, 7 and it litigated the choice-
of-law issue all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court sided
with Ricoh, holding that the decision to transfer is governed by federal
rather than state law.8 Thus, in the end, Ricoh from New York
prevailed over Stewart from Alabama in selecting the forum for
litigation.
Notably, the Court did not address the proper choice of law for
motions to dismiss, because Ricoh abandoned that particular issue
after losing at the district court level.9 The Eleventh Circuit,
nonetheless, provided guidance on this issue, suggesting in broad dicta
that federal law not only determines whether forum selection clauses
should be enforced through a motion to transfer, but also a motion to
dismiss. 10 Thus, a defendant seeking to enforce a forum selection
clause through a motion to dismiss in the Eleventh Circuit would
likely benefit from the application of favorable federal law, rather
than state law.
Yet if this exact situation were to recur in a state located in a
different federal circuit, a federal court considering a forum selection
clause's enforceability could reach a dramatically different result.
Assume the following scenario. Carol from North Carolina enters into
a contract with Ricoh from New York, and their contract contains a
forum selection clause identical to the one in Stewart Organization,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. The deal falls apart, and Carol files suit in federal
district court in North Carolina.11 Ricoh again seeks to enforce the
clause and bring the litigation home to New York. Nonetheless, Ricoh
still faces the choice of bringing a motion to dismiss or a motion to
transfer. If Ricoh files a motion to transfer, the North Carolina federal
7. See MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding that forum
selection clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced unless . . . [they are]
unreasonable' under the circumstances").
8. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988) (requiring the application of
federal law); see also infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. While this holding was, in a
sense, a victory for Ricoh, its attempt to move the litigation to New York was not fully successful
until it obtained a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals over the recalcitrant Alabama
district court. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573-74 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
district court had "clearly abused its discretion" in its determination that the forum selection
clause should not be enforced under federal law, and granting a writ of mandamus to transfer to
New York).
9. See id. at 28 n.8 (noting that "the parties do not dispute that the District Court properly
denied the motion to dismiss the case").
10. See Stewart Org., 779 F.2d at 647 ("[V]enue in a diversity case is manifestly within the
province of federal law.").
11. It is also possible that Carol could file in North Carolina state court, but that would not
substantially affect the progression of litigation, because Ricoh could satisfy the federal diversity
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and remove to federal court automatically under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
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court would follow Stewart and apply federal law in determining
whether the case should be transferred. 12 As a practical matter, this
would likely result in the clause being enforced through transfer to the
New York federal court. 13 However, if Ricoh files a motion to dismiss,
the district court-lacking any guidance from Stewart on choice-of-law
as to motions to dismiss-would likely apply state law in its
determination as to dismissal.14 The district court would therefore
apply North Carolina law, 15 which disfavors forum selection clauses as
a matter of public policy.16 The motion to dismiss would accordingly be
denied, and the litigation would continue in North Carolina. Thus,
whether Ricoh would be successful in moving litigation from North
Carolina to New York would turn on the procedural device it employed
to enforce the clause. Unlike Stewart from Alabama, Carol from North
Carolina could keep the litigation in her home state, so long as Ricoh
did not realize the surprising legal significance of bringing a motion to
transfer instead of a motion to dismiss.
For a final variation, suppose that the forum selection clause in
Carol and Ricoh's contract required litigation to be brought in a New
York state court. The federal venue transfer statute does not allow
federal courts to transfer to state courts, 17 so Ricoh would have only
one option under this variation: a motion to dismiss.18 However, as
previously shown, the North Carolina federal district court would
apply state law to a motion to dismiss the case due to the forum
selection clause. 19 The motion to dismiss would likely be denied, and
the litigation would again remain in North Carolina. Thus, simply
12. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 28 (requiring the application of federal law).
13. Though the presence of the clause is not dispositive in the federal transfer analysis, it is
a significant factor to be considered. Id. at 31; see also infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
14. See Nutter v. New Rents, Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 WL 193490, at *5-7 (4th Cir. Oct. 1,
1991) (applying state law in the analysis of a motion to dismiss to enforce a forum selection
clause in a diversity case). Because North Carolina sits in the Fourth Circuit, this case is
controlling precedent over the North Carolina district court.
15. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (requiring the
application of the forum state's choice-of-law rules). Assume additionally that these choice-of-law
rules would determine that North Carolina law would apply (perhaps because it was the place of
contracting or the place of performance). Assume further that the agreement did not contain an
enforceable choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of another state.
16. See Map Supply, Inc. v. Integrated Inventory Solutions, LLC, No. 07-733, 2008 WML
2096791, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. May 20, 2008) (table opinion) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3
(2007)).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (allowing only for transfer to "any other district [court] or
division").
18. This motion to dismiss could specifically seek to enforce the forum selection clause, or it
could similarly argue that the court should exercise its discretion to dismiss under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
19. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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because the parties selected a state court rather than a federal one as
their forum for any future litigation, Ricoh would have no means to
enforce the clause at all. Carol from North Carolina would prevail in
selecting the forum.
A comparison of the situations of real-life Stewart and
hypothetical Carol illustrates the incoherence of forum selection
clause jurisprudence. In each scenario, two diverse parties enter into a
contract with a forum selection clause, and one of the parties brings
suit in a contractually improper forum. However, Stewart could not
depend on state law and therefore could not retain litigation in
Alabama, while Carol could rely on her state's law and keep litigation
in North Carolina. This inconsistency is the result of a circuit split in
which some circuits-such as the Fourth Circuit that presides over
Carol's litigation in North Carolina-apply state law to motions to
dismiss on account of forum selection clauses, while others apply
federal law in that determination. 20
Although illustrated here by a hypothetical, this inconsistency
affects the administration of real justice on a grand scale. Empirical
studies show that plaintiffs in federal civil cases are half as likely to
be successful once their case has been transferred to a new forum. 21
Additionally, the ever-increasing use of forum selection clauses in
contracts implies that the determination of clause enforcement affects
a growing universe of litigants. 22 The combination of the increasing
prevalence of these clauses and their significance in outcome
determination underscores the importance of uniformity, which is
currently lacking in the law.
Instead of a relying on a uniform standard, whether a federal
court will enforce a forum selection clause depends on the basis of
jurisdiction, 23 the fortuity of the federal circuit in which the parties
are located,24 the selection of a federal rather than a state (or
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 124 (2002) (conducting multiple regression analysis to conclude that "[p]laintiffs' win
rate in federal civil cases drops from 58% in cases in which there is no transfer to 29% in
transferred cases").
22. Exact numbers are difficult to obtain, but a series of Westlaw searches for "forum
selection clause" in all federal court opinions indicates a strong trend underscoring the
increasing importance of forum selection clauses in federal litigation: 12 (1980); 49 (1985); 112
(1990); 148 (1995); 203 (2000); 258 (2004); 382 (2005); 536 (2006); 581 (2007).
23. As more fully explained supra in Part ILA, courts apply different analysis to forum
selection clauses when their jurisdiction is grounded in diversity rather than in admiralty or
questions of federal law.
24. See infra Part II.C.
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international) forum, 25 and the procedural device the defendant
employs to enforce it.26 As the law currently stands, these factors may
be dispositive even though they lack intuitive appeal as the proper
determinants. 27 Worse still, an additional circuit split exists as to
which of several potentially proper dismissal motions defendants
should employ when seeking to enforce these clauses through
dismissal rather than transfer. 2
This Note demonstrates that the current circuit splits on the
issues of choice of law and proper dismissal motion for forum selection
clauses in federal courts could both be resolved by a single, uniform
approach. Part II details the creation and protraction of these circuit
splits and identifies how their persistence is due to the collision of two
fundamental legal principles. Part III explains how forum selection
clause jurisprudence has created a logical tangle such that no judicial
decision alone could fully unknot the problem. It further argues that
the possibility of using either a motion to dismiss or a motion to
transfer to enforce forum selection clauses has bifurcated the analysis
and obscured the underlying issues. As a solution, Part IV argues for
the creation of a single Federal Rule of Civil Procedure containing a
uniform standard for enforcing forum selection clauses so that all
federal courts use the same analysis for this important determination.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
A. The Development of Federal Law on the Enforceability of Forum
Selection Clauses
Although state and federal law disfavored forum selection
clauses throughout much of the twentieth century,29 the Supreme
Court's 1972 decision in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
25. When no federal forum is selected, transfer cannot be used to enforce the clause. See
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
26. The defendant can seek to enforce it through transfer or dismissal. See infra Part II.B.
27. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum
Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TuL. L. REV. 973, 1032-34 (2008) (explaining that a
"host of problems bedevil [forum selection] clause enforcement in the lower federal courts").
28. See infra Part I.B.
29. E.g., Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity
Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 666 (1997) ("Until the mid-twentieth
century, federal as well as state courts refused to enforce forum selection clauses and entertained
cases brought in violation of such clauses. The courts' reluctance to recognize forum selection
clauses lay in the notion that parties may not diminish or oust the jurisdiction of a court through
contractual agreements.").
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announced a strong federal policy in favor of enforcing such clauses.30
Zapata involved a dispute between American and German
corporations over damages that occurred to a drilling rig while it was
being towed from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea.31 Although the
contract between the two corporations contained a forum selection
clause requiring any disputes to be brought in English courts, the
American corporation sued the German corporation in a U.S. district
court sitting in admiralty jurisdiction. 32 The German defendant moved
for dismissal because of the clause. 33 Reversing the lower courts'
denial of this motion,34 the Supreme Court held that the forum
selection clause should be enforced, declaring that "such clauses are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless... [they are]
'unreasonable' under the circumstances."35
Two years after Zapata, the Court reiterated its new policy in
favor of enforcing forum selection clauses. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., it held that an arbitration clause must be enforced under the
terms of the U.S. Arbitration Act.3 6 In doing so, the Court cited the
Zapata standard for federal courts' exercise of federal question
jurisdiction.37 Thus, in admiralty and federal question cases, forum
selection clauses are generally enforceable.
This emerging trend of enforcing reasonable forum selection
clauses in federal courts came to an abrupt halt in Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp.38 As discussed previously, Ricoh sought to enforce the
forum selection clause by filing in federal district court motions to
dismiss and to transfer. 39 The district court denied both motions based
on a state-law policy against such clauses, but the Eleventh Circuit
reversed and held that federal law applied to the transfer motion.40
30. 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972).
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 6-7.
35. Id. at 10. The Court acknowledged the expanding global economy, the need for
American businesses to make enforceable concessions on forum, the general desire for freedom of
contract, and the fact that such clauses dispense with costly uncertainties regarding where suit
may be brought. Id. at 11-14.
36. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 201).
37. Id. at 518-19 (explaining, in the context of a suit brought under the federal securities
laws, that "an agreement to arbitrate . . . is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection
clause" and therefore referring to the Zapata standard of enforcing forum selection).
38. 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988).
39. Id. at 24. The defendant moved to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and moved to
dismiss under 28 U.S.C § 1406 due to improper venue.
40. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en banc),
aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22. While Zapata constituted a symbolic change in favor of
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Because Ricoh had not appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss, 41
the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court analyzed only the motion
to transfer. Affirming the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court held that federal law applies to a motion to transfer to the
contractually agreed-upon forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).42
In Stewart, the Court delineated a federal standard for
considering motions to transfer that differed from the standard
announced in Zapata and Scherk. Under the new Stewart standard,
when a defendant in a diversity case seeks to enforce a forum selection
clause by moving to transfer to the contractually agreed-upon federal
forum, the court first looks to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to determine the
propriety of the transfer. That statute instructs that a court "may"
transfer any civil action to a district where it might have been brought
"[flor the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice."43 While the focus is on "convenience" and "justice," the court
must also give due consideration to the existence of the clause:44 it
should enforce the clause only if the agreed-upon forum is convenient
and fair in light of the parties' relative bargaining power.45 The
existence of the clause is therefore a significant, but not dispositive,
factor. 46 By giving the clause only limited weight, the Court created a
more nuanced standard for motions to transfer in diversity
jurisdiction than the strong presumption of enforceability it had laid
out for courts exercising admiralty or federal question jurisdiction.
enforcing such clauses in the federal system, it was brought in admiralty jurisdiction and was
not binding precedent for federal courts generally. 407 U.S. at 3; cf. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1981) (explaining that federal common law developed
under admiralty jurisdiction is not freely transferable to other settings). Although some of
Zapata's reasoning relied on considerations of international commerce that were perhaps more
peculiar to admiralty, much of its analysis appeared to apply in non-admiralty settings. For
example, the considerations of dispensing with costly uncertainties of where suit might be
brought and of the general desire for freedom of contract appear quite important in the wholly-
domestic setting, as well. Cf. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the reasoning of Zapata "applies with much force to federal courts
sitting in diversity").
41. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 28 n.8.
42. Id. at 28 (holding, under the analysis of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), that §
1404(a) was both a sufficiently broad federal statute to control the matter and a valid exercise of
congressional authority).
43. 28U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
44. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29-30 ('The flexible and individualized analysis Congress
prescribed in § 1404(a) thus encompasses consideration of the parties' private expression of their
venue preferences.").
45. Id. at 29.
46. See id. at 31 ('The forum selection clause . . . should receive neither dispositive
consideration . . . nor no consideration . . . but rather the consideration for which Congress
provided in § 1404(a).").
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Justice Kennedy concurred in the Stewart decision, while
Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Kennedy urged that the Zapata
standard of enforcing forum selection clauses should apply in diversity
cases as in admiralty and federal question cases, despite the fact that
the federal transfer statute contained its own factors for
consideration. 47 Meanwhile, Justice Scalia insisted that federal courts
sitting in diversity should apply state law when analyzing attempts to
enforce forum selection clauses through motions to transfer.48 He first
argued that § 1404(a) was not broad enough to cover what should have
properly been considered a state-law contract issue.49 Finding no
direct collision between state and federal law, Justice Scalia turned to
the twin aims of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,50 the seminal choice-of-
law case, and argued that courts should not apply federal judge-made
law.51
What no Justice addressed, however, was the possibility that a
defendant might attempt to enforce a forum selection clause through a
motion to dismiss rather than a motion to transfer. Because Ricoh did
not pursue its attempt to enforce the clause through dismissal, the
Stewart Court did not determine whether state or federal law should
apply in diversity cases to motions to dismiss based on forum selection
clauses.52 Nor did the Stewart Court provide any insight as to which of
several potentially applicable foundations for a motion to dismiss
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper to enforce such a
clause. Since Stewart, the Court has only revisited its forum selection
clause jurisprudence once and only to reiterate its strong presumption
of enforcing such clauses in the context of federal courts in admiralty
47. See id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the reasoning of Zapata "applies
with much force to federal courts sitting in diversity" and arguing that its standard presuming
enforceability should apply in that setting as well).
48. Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 34-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
51. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the application of
federal law would potentially cause both forum shopping and the inequitable administration of
the laws (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
52. See, e.g., Phoebe Kornfeld, Note, The Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses After
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 175, 191 (1989) ("Stewart
addressed only the narrow issue of dealing with a motion to transfer based on a forum-selection
clause; little guidance is provided in Stewart on how a forum-selection clause should influence a
decision when the motion is for dismissal rather than transfer."); Lee, supra note 29, at 671
('"The Ricoh court did not decide whether district courts sitting in diversity should accept forum
selection clauses as prima facie valid .... ").
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jurisdiction.5 3 Simply put, the Court's failure to anticipate the common
scenario of an attempt to enforce a forum selection clause through a
motion to dismiss has left the law in a state of disarray.
The gaps in these holdings have resulted in federal courts'
application of different standards to determine the enforceability of
forum selection clauses when a court's jurisdiction is grounded in
diversity, rather than admiralty or a federal question. For courts
sitting in admiralty or federal question jurisdiction, such clauses must
be enforced unless they are unreasonable. 54 Courts sitting in diversity,
however, must perform the § 1404(a) analysis when the defendant
moves to enforce the clause through transfer.55 These courts do not
start with a presumption of reasonableness but rather determine, in
their discretion, whether transfer is "convenient" for the parties and
"in the interests of justice."56 When the defendant moves to enforce the
clause through dismissal, courts sitting in diversity are split as to
which standard should apply.57 As forum selection clauses and
disputes between diverse parties have become more ubiquitous, these
inconsistencies, open questions, and their resulting interactions have
resulted in a tangled and confusing area of the law.
B. The Proper Motion Problem: How Should the Defendant Enforce the
Clause by Dismissal?
The federal circuit courts are also split on the question of which
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure a defendant must use to enforce a
forum selection clause when moving to dismiss. 58 Motions to dismiss
are a vital alternative to motions to transfer for defendants seeking to
enforce these clauses for two reasons. First, when a forum selection
clause does not select a federal forum, a motion to dismiss is a
defendant's only option for enforcement because the federal transfer
statute only allows for transfers to other federal courts. 59 Second, even
53. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991) (holding in the
context of admiralty jurisdiction that forum selection clauses on cruise ship tickets selecting
Florida, the cruise company's principal place of business, were reasonable and enforceable).
54. See id. at 595; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-21 (1974)
(explaining that the Zapata presumption applies in the federal question setting).
55. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 28 (requiring the application of the § 1404(a) standard).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. See, e.g., Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing differing outcomes as to whether a 12(b)(3) motion could be used to remove the case);
Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 388 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that there
are "variegated views" among the circuits on this issue and thoroughly documenting the split).
59. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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when a clause selects a federal forum, a defendant often will prefer a
motion to dismiss to a motion to transfer because of the choice-of-law
implications in the continuing litigation: transfer will cause the
choice-of-law rules of the plaintiffs initial forum to apply to the
continuing litigation, while dismissal will not.60 Accordingly, if the
plaintiff files suit in a jurisdiction with highly unfavorable choice-of-
law rules for the defendant, a defendant's motion to transfer will not
escape the damaging effects of those rules.
Despite the importance of motions to dismiss as a mechanism
to enforce forum selection clauses, the Federal Rules are silent as to
whether a motion to dismiss can be used to enforce these clauses.61
Instead, there are currently three different types of motions that
defendants have employed to seek dismissal on the basis of a forum
selection clause. 62 First, defendants have moved for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(3) on the theory that the clause makes venue in the initial
forum improper. 63 Second, defendants have sought dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) on the theory that bringing the suit in the agreed-upon
60. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., In re Millennium Studios, Inc., 286 B.R. 300, 306 (D. Md. 2002) ("There is
currently no procedural mechanism specifically tailored to handle a motion to dismiss based on a
forum selection clause."). While the federal rules do not provide a limited list of enumerated
motions, cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1) (explaining that "a request for a court order must be made by
motion" but not limiting the types of motions as with the types of pleadings), several available
grounds for motions to dismiss are listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
62. It should be noted that limited authority exists for a fourth alternative motion to seek
dismissal due to a forum selection clause: the defendant could file a motion to specifically enforce
the terms of the forum selection clause. See, e.g., Kerobo, 285 F.3d at 540 (Bertelsman, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that courts should view a motion to enforce a forum selection clause as
"one to specifically enforce the clause"); see also Langley v. Prudential Mortgage Capital Co., 546
F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing that forum selection clauses
should be "support[ed]," even though the defendant had not yet filed any motion to enforce the
clause, in order to prevent unnecessary, time-consuming litigation); Leandra man, Note, Viva
Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 466 (1991) (explaining that a defendant might "make a 'motion to dismiss
based on the forum-selection clause' "). In theory, by bringing suit in a forum other than the one
contractually agreed upon, the plaintiff has breached the agreement, and the court should be
able to provide a remedy by specifically enforcing that aspect of the agreement. While not
grounded in a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, this approach has the advantage of being more
closely aligned with the reality of the situation. Indeed, the defendant seeking to enforce the
clause is in actuality not seeking dismissal because the initial venue is improper or because the
plaintiff failed to state all the necessary elements of its cause of action, but rather because that
defendant desires to enforce the terms of its agreement. While this approach may be
theoretically appealing, it has not gained traction with courts or litigants.
63. See, e.g., Commerce Consultants Int'l v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697, 699-700
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that defendant's choice of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss due to a
forum selection clause was proper). A rule 12(b)(3) motion seeks dismissal on the basis of
"improper venue." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
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forum is a necessary element to sustain the cause of action.64 Third,
defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) on the
theory that the forum selection clause eliminates the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the initial forum. 65 Most circuit courts have selected
either Rule 12(b)(3) or Rule 12(b)(6) as the exclusive legal foundation
for a defendant moving to dismiss due to a forum selection clause.66
Some courts have gone so far as to disregard the specific Rule 12(b)
subsection cited by the defendant and instead interpret any motion to
dismiss for improper forum as grounded in the correct subsection. 67
The Fourth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
have held that a defendant seeking to enforce a forum selection clause
through dismissal must utilize Rule 12(b)(3) and move to dismiss for
improper venue. 68 These circuits assert that the use of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is problematic because it both is inconsistent with the pleading
standard required by the Court in Zapata69 and creates timing
concerns by allowing defendants to "hold back" forum selection clause
objections until late in the litigation process. 70 Additionally, the Rule
64. See, e.g., Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1122 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding that defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss due to a forum selection clause was properly granted). A rule
12(b)(6) motion seeks dismissal due to the plaintiffs "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
65. See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1984)
(analyzing the defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss grounded in part on a forum selection
clause). A rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal due to the "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction" of
the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
66. See, e.g., Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 388 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001)
(citing several cases that held these motions should be brought under Rule 12(b)(3) or 12(b)(6)
but only one case that held they should be brought under Rule 12(b)(1)). The only case of which
the author is aware holding that Rule 12(b)(1) is the proper foundation for a motion to dismiss
due to a forum selection clause is AVC Nederland, 740 F.2d at 156.
67. See, e.g., Lambert, 983 F.2d at 1112 n.1 (quoting LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint.
Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984)) (explaining that the court is "not bound by the label below,"
and therefore may ignore any error in the district court granting a motion to dismiss the
defendant nominally brought under both Rule 12(b)(3) and instead of only under Rule 12(b)(6)).
68. See, e.g., Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.
2006); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998);
Arguenda v. Banco Mexicano, 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996); Commerce Consultants, 867 F.2d
at 698.
69. While Rule 12(b)(6) requires a court to accept the pleadings as true, the Zapata
standard does not accept the truth of the pleadings. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 549. Thus,
courts are unable to conduct analysis consistent with both the mandates of Rule 12(b)(6) and the
instructions of the Court in Zapata. Id. On the contrary, Rule 12(b)(3) motions do not require the
pleadings to be accepted as true.
70. Because Rule 12(b)(6) motions may be raised at any time in the proceedings before
disposition on the merits, see FED. R. C1V. P. 12(h) (allowing a party to bring a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim at any point in the litigation up through trial), defendants can wait to
spring the clause until after litigation begins to unfold unfavorably for them, thereby wasting
judicial resources and undermining the efficiency and convenience created by those forum
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12(b)(3) proponents reason that their approach is more consistent with
the Supreme Court's holding in Stewart.71
However, the First and Sixth Circuits have held instead that a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is the proper device.7 2 These courts counter that,
if venue is proper under the federal venue statute, 73 a Rule 12(b)(3)
motion to dismiss for improper venue is not the appropriate method to
address the validity of a forum selection clause.7 4 The circuits adopting
this view rely on language from a footnote in Stewart in which the
Supreme Court explained that the motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a) for improper venue was properly denied because the parties
satisfied the requirements of the federal venue statute. 75 Because a
motion to dismiss for improper venue due to a forum selection clause
was not proper in that case, the proponents of Rule 12(b)(6) reason
that it is never a valid motion to enforce a forum selection clause.76
While arguments exist for either alternative, no clearly preferable
option has emerged.
While the choice of the proper basis for a motion to dismiss
may appear at first to be a mere semantic matter, this choice can have
real and significant ramifications for the rights of the parties. The
court's determination of the proper motion will determine whether the
defendant's attempt to enforce the clause will be waived if not
selection clauses. Sucampo Pharms., 471 F.3d at 549. The proponents of Rule 12(b)(3) explain
that this problem would not arise under that motion, because it is waived if not raised in the first
responsive pleading. Id. at 549.
71. Because the Stewart Court relied upon the federal venue transfer statute to enforce a
forum selection clause, these courts argue that such clauses are properly considered a matter of
venue, and that a Rule 12(b)(3) motion for improper venue should therefore apply. Lipcon, 148
F.3d at 1290.
72. See, e.g., Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 535-36 (6th Cir. 2002); LFC
Lessors, Inc. v. Pac. Sewer Maint., 739 F.2d 4, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1984). Additionally, the Second and
Fourth Circuits have dismissed cases due to forum selection clauses when the defendant filed a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (4th
Cir. 1985); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 1984). While
Rule 12(b)(1) motions have been entertained for this purpose in the past, the bulk of the
controversy amounts to whether a Rule 12(b)(3) motion or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is preferable.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000). This statute sets requirements for venue to be proper in any
particular federal court.
74. See, e.g., LFC Lessors, Inc., 739 F.2d at 7 (holding that venue was proper such that a
motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(3) was inapposite because that case satisfied the venue
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391). In other words, because only Congress, and not the parties,
has the authority to confer proper venue upon the federal courts, the mere fact that the parties
agreed ex ante to another forum does not affect proper venue.
75. See Kerobo, 285 F.3d at 536 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 n.8
(1988)) (reasoning that the Court's holding in Stewart "is a clear signal that if venue is proper
under the statute, a motion to transfer for improper venue will not lie").
76. Id.
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introduced early in the litigation. 77 Additionally, when the proper
motion is neither intuitive nor the majority rule, the probability
increases that unwary practitioners might accidentally waive their
only opportunity to enforce the clause for their clients. Moreover, this
choice of motion affects whether the court must initially determine
issues such as subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
before confronting the issue of the forum selection clause. 78 For all
these reasons, the choice of proper motion is indeed an important one,
and the variation from circuit to circuit serves as a trap for unwary
litigants.
C. The Choice-of-Law Problem: Should Courts Apply State or Federal
Law to Motions to Dismiss?
In addition to the proper-motion problem, another daunting
question plagues defendants seeking to enforce forum selection
clauses in diversity cases: Does federal or state law apply in
determining whether the motion to dismiss should be granted? This
question, left open by the Supreme Court in Stewart, has resulted in a
second circuit split.79 A majority of the circuits that have confronted
this question directly has determined that federal law must apply,8 0
while a minority has held that state law controls the issue.81
Meanwhile, a few other circuits have acknowledged this uncertainty
but have punted, instead finding temporary means to sidestep the
problem.8 2 Thus, depending on the initial federal forum, a defendant
seeking dismissal might benefit from the application of a strong
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See generally Jonathan L. Corsico, Comment,
Forum Non Conveniens: A Vehicle for Federal Court Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses
That Name Non-Federal Forums as Proper, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1853, 1873-75 (2003) (explaining
the role of waiver as to each potential procedural device that may be used to enforce a forum
selection clause in federal courts).
78. If a court considers forum selection clause enforcement dismissal motions to be made
under Rule 12(b)(6), then it is first required to determine if both its personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction are proper. See Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548
(4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the court must resolve whether a motion to dismiss based on a
forum selection clause should be based on Rule 12(b)(6) or a different rule in order to determine
whether the district court should have first considered a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
79. See, e.g., M.B. Rests., Inc. v. CKE Rests., Inc., 183 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that there is "some disagreement among the circuits regarding" whether the
analysis of motions to enforce a forum selection clause through dismissal in a diversity case is
governed by federal or state law).
80. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
81. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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federal law presumption in favor of clause enforcement or might
instead be confronted with a state-law policy disfavoring such clauses.
The Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
motions to dismiss on the basis of a forum selection clause must be
analyzed under federal law.8 3 The federal standard that these circuits
apply is not the more nuanced standard from Stewart for defendants
seeking to enforce the clause through transfer under § 1404(a), but
rather the Zapata presumption of enforcing reasonable clauses.8 4
However, while these circuits have agreed that federal law (and the
Zapata standard) must be applied, they have proffered a wide range of
justifications for this common conclusion: federal law should apply
because (1) venue is a procedural matter,8 5 (2) federal interests in the
matter outweigh state interests,8 6 and (3) the reasoning behind
Zapata's admiralty holding is equally applicable to diversity cases.8 7
While most circuits that have directly confronted the question
have applied federal law, the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have
applied state law in their analyses of whether a forum selection clause
should be enforced through a motion to dismiss. 88 These courts have
also justified their holdings through diverse reasoning. One court
83. See, e.g., Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1996);
Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858
F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Int'l Software Sys., 77 F.3d at 115 (explaining that several federal circuits had
decided to "continue to apply [Zapata] to motions to dismiss based on a forum selection clause"
and determining to do the same even though the court "prefer[red] to apply . . . Stewart
balancing [of § 1404(a)]").
85. See Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1067-69 (reasoning through Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965), that federal law on venue is controlling and thereby implying that federal law
controls regardless of whether the defendant seeks to enforce a clause through dismissal or
transfer).
86. See Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 513 (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356
U.S. 525 (1958)) (reasoning that "[t]he Erie choice is best accomplished by balancing the federal
and state interests").
87. See Evolution Online Sys., Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d 505, 510
n.10 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, at least one circuit court has held that federal law should apply
simply because holding otherwise would "further complicate this area of the law." Int'l Software
Sys., 77 F.3d at 115.
88. See, e.g., Nutter v. New Rents, Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 WL 193490, at *5-7 (4th Cir. Oct.
1, 1991); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
1986); Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986).
Indeed, one could argue that an intra-circuit split exists on the Eighth Circuit, in which one
panel of judges held that state law applied and another panel held that federal law applies.
Compare Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1986)
(concluding in dicta that forum selection clauses involve venue issues and are therefore
procedural clauses governed by federal law), with Farmland Indus., 806 F.2d at 852 (choosing to
apply state law to forum selection clauses and distinguishing Sun World as involving admiralty
law). This conflict is noted by the court in Manetti-Farrow. 858 F.2d at 513 n.3.
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explained that questions of contract are usually matters of state law;8 9
another determined that a choice-of-law clause selecting a particular
state's laws was enforceable; 90 and a final court merely cited another
court's determination with approval.91 While each of these cases is
arguably distinguishable from the typical forum selection clause
scenario, 92 other notable judges have also shown support for the state-
law-controls position. Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Gerard E.
Lynch of the Second Circuit have both expressed support for the
minority position that state-rather than federal-law should apply to
forum selection clauses. 93
The most common approach by courts, however, is to avoid
making a determination between state and federal law at all by
finding a temporary solution. Because many states have adopted the
89. Gen. Eng'g Corp., 783 F.2d at 356 ("The construction of contracts is usually a matter of
state, not federal, common law.").
90. See Nutter, 1991 WL 193490, at *6 (beginning its analysis of the enforceability of the
clause by determining, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), that the
law of the forum state should be applied in the diversity setting, and deciding that the law of the
forum state, West Virginia, would uphold the choice-of-law clause selecting Louisiana law in the
contract).
91. See Farmland Indus., 806 F.2d at 852 (citing Gen. Eng'g Corp., 783 F.2d 352)
(explaining in three sentences that "[w]hether a contractual forum selection clause is substantive
or procedural is a difficult question" and holding that "consideration should have been given to
the public policy of [the forum state]" because of "the close relationship between substance and
procedure in this case").
92. All three of the cases present their own unique circumstances. In General Engineering
Corp., federal jurisdiction was not grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 but rather was based upon a
local Virgin Islands statute which "vest[ed] original jurisdiction in the District Court of the
Virgin Islands in civil suits when the amount in controversy exceed[ed] $200,000." 783 F.2d at
357 (citing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 76(a) (1984)). But see id. at 357 n.4 (explaining that, although
its opinion "d[id] not directly control district courts sitting in diversity, [its] discussion of the
issues involved in applying federal common law indicates that these courts should apply the
choice-of-law rule of the state in which they sit"). Moreover, in Farmland Industries, the court
appeared to be sitting in federal question jurisdiction, rather than diversity jurisdiction, though
it did not clearly indicate this in its analysis. See 806 F.2d at 849, 852 (indicating that one of the
claims plaintiff had filed in district court was a violation of the Securities Act of 1933, but still
citing to General Engineering in making its determination that state law should apply in the
analysis of the forum selection clause). Finally, in Nutter, the Fourth Circuit chose not to publish
its opinion, and--even though it came to the conclusion that Louisiana state law should apply-
it held that Louisiana law was the same as the federal Zapata standard. Nutter, 1991
WL193490, at *5-7.
93. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Under the twin-aims test, I believe state law controls the question of the validity of a forum-
selection clause between the parties."); Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians, & Health Care
Workers of N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is
strongly arguable that in a diversity case, the validity of such clauses should be determined by
state law, which generally governs substantive questions involving the making and enforcement
of contracts."). Judge Lynch moved from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in September of 2009.
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Zapata standard as their own policies favoring the enforcement of
forum selection clauses, several circuits have decided that the
application of either federal or applicable state law would lead to the
same conclusion as to enforceability. 94 Additionally, at least two courts
have chosen to apply the Zapata standard due to the express
preferences of the litigants.95 In short, the choice-of-law question for
forum selection clauses has widely divided the circuit courts. A
consistent, universal standard would serve as welcome relief for both
puzzled practitioners and a fractured judiciary.
III. WHY COURTS ALONE CANNOT FULLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM
The proper-motion and choice-of-law problems have persisted
in large part due to fundamental theoretical issues that have
remained largely unexplored. Courts have been unable to reach a
consensus on the correct procedural mechanism for enforcing forum
selection clauses because the two devices they have used, Rule 12(b)
motions and the federal transfer statute, are improper in the first
place. Similarly, courts have divided over whether state or federal law
governs these issues because, in essence, two core legal principles are
at odds. Moreover, both of these circuit splits stem from two common
sources of confusion that need to be addressed-a lack of foresight in
the Federal Rules and the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart.
Because the solutions proposed to both circuit splits thus far have not
fully contemplated these theoretical issues, the current solutions have
proven inadequate.
94. The First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have all utilized this approach.
See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J.) (applying the Zapata standard because "Illinois law concerning the validity of
forum selection clauses is materially the same as federal law"); Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica
Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 386 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying the Zapata standard because both Puerto
Rico and federal law applied that standard); Security Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d
369, 375 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying the Zapata standard because 'Tennessee law is consistent
with the rule of Zapata"); Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc., 106 F.3d 318, 320 (10th
Cir. 1997) (applying the Zapata standard due to finding of "no material discrepancies between
Colorado law and federal common law"); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993)
(applying the Zapata standard due to determination of "no material discrepancy between
Washington state law and federal law" on that matter); Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen
Elecs. (Canada) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying the Zapata standard because
Pennsylvania, Canadian, and federal law 'look favorably on forum selection clauses").
95. M.B. Rests., Inc. v. CKE Rests., Inc., 183 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying the
Zapata standard because neither party disputed that both federal and state law were the same
as to enforceability of forum selection clauses); Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 379
(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (applying Zapata standard where parties stipulated to its application,
and suggesting that the application of federal law was "probably ... correct" but that the court
"need not decide this").
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A. The Federal Transfer Statute and All Rule 12(b) Motions Are
Improper, Ad Hoc Devices to Enforce a Forum Selection Clause
The underlying reason for the proper-motion problem is that
the federal procedural devices used to enforce forum selection
clauses-including the three potentially applicable Rule 12(b) motions
and the federal transfer statute-were conceived at a time when those
clauses did not have the ubiquitous presence that they have today.96
Because no single motion was created with forum selection clauses in
mind, these procedural devices have arisen as ad hoc mechanisms to
enforce these clauses in federal courts. 97 As such, Rule 12(b) motions
do not satisfy the need for a procedural device to enforce the clauses-
and the federal courts have recognized this by documenting the
inadequacies of each subsection of the rule.98 These inadequacies thus
demonstrate why Rule 12(b) motions are improper mechanisms for
enforcing forum selection clauses.
Moreover, the federal transfer statute is perhaps an even less
adequate mechanism to enforce forum selection clauses. First, the
transfer statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404, cannot be used to
enforce forum selection clauses specifying a state or international
court as the forum for litigation. 99 If parties have a general right to
select their own forum for litigation ex ante and to have that forum
honored by a court, it seems odd to employ a procedural mechanism
that automatically cuts out the majority of potential forums in the
country. Even assuming that Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss remain an
alternative avenue for clause enforcement, defendants specifying a
state or international forum are at a disadvantage in having one fewer
96. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated by the Supreme Court in
1938, and "the Rules and their vision of American litigation remain pretty much intact." THOMAS
D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE 17-18 (2d ed. 2004). On the
contrary, forum selection clauses did not become a standard part of contracts until the latter part
of the twentieth century. This is likely due to "wider embrace of the enforceable forum selection
clauses at this time." Marcus, supra note 27, at 1005.
97. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
98. See supra Part I.B; Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Bertelsman, J., dissenting) (explaining how the Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6) motions are
all flawed as clause enforcement devices and arguing that "the proper approach is to regard a
motion raising a forum selection clause, however labeled, as one to specifically enforce the
clause"); see also Lederman, supra note 62, at 433-47 (demonstrating how "the use of make-shift
motions for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is fraught with problems").
99. So long as some forum selection clauses select non-federal forums, another mechanism
aside from § 1404(a) is necessary to allow for clause enforcement in those circumstances where §
1404(a) cannot be invoked. While the doctrine of forum non conveniens allows courts to dismiss
cases under what is essentially the same standard as § 1404(a), the use of that doctrine is
problematic for other reasons. See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
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mechanism for enforcement-such defendants get one less bite at the
apple of enforceability. 100
Second, using both § 1404 and Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss in
order to enforce forum selection clauses unnecessarily bifurcates the
analysis by forcing a court to apply two different standards. A court
first must apply the motion-to-dismiss standard, which will depend on
whether the jurisdiction applies state or federal law to the question. 10 1
If a court determines that dismissal is not appropriate, it still must go
on and determine whether transfer is, under the standard enunciated
by § 1404, "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses" and "in the
interest of justice.' 01 2 By introducing a separate standard to the
analysis, the federal transfer statute creates more administrative
work both for judges, who must analyze and issue rulings on both
transfer and dismissal, and the parties, who must conduct more
research and lengthen their briefs. 10 3 It also obscures the real issue,
which is not whether justice or convenience would be better served by
litigation in a different forum-the criteria specified by the statute-
but simply whether the parties' contractual choice of a forum should
be enforced.
The third reason the federal transfer statute is problematic is
because it allows the plaintiff to benefit from the choice-of-law rules of
the initial forum. When a federal court transfers a case under § 1404,
the case must proceed under the choice-of-law rules of the transferor
forum. 10 4 Thus, a court that enforces the clause by transferring the
case is likely giving the plaintiff a benefit that was not bargained
for.'0 5 On the contrary, when the initial court enforces the clause
100. This practice of filing both motions does, indeed, appear to be the most common
approach used by practitioners today seeking to enforce a clause selecting another federal forum.
Cf., e.g., Kerobo, 285 F.3d at 533 (recounting that the defendant filed both a Rule 12(b)(3) motion
to dismiss and a motion to transfer).
101. See supra Part II.C.
102. 28 U.S.C § 1404(a) (2006).
103. Moreover, the bifurcation of the analysis causes a complication for judges in situations
where the defendant seeks to invoke the forum selection clause on appeal but did not expressly
move to enforce the clause through transfer or dismissal at lower court. See Langley v.
Prudential Mortgage Capital Co, 546 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J. dissenting)
(arguing, in a case in which the three-judge panel resulted in one majority opinion, one
concurrence, and one dissenting opinion, that remanding the case back to the district court so the
defendant could file a motion "further prolong[s] and protract[s] the litigation by sending it back
to the same alien courtroom for unnecessary motions, delay and wasted litigation costs").
104. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (holding that the transferee court
must apply the state law that the transferor court would have applied when a case is transferred
under § 1404(a)).
105. Indeed, the policy justification behind the decision that the choice-of-law rules of the
transferor court should follow the litigation to the transferee forum does not appear to apply in
such situations where the plaintiff filed in a venue in contravention of its agreement. See id. at
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through dismissal, the choice-of-law rules of the agreed-upon forum
will control once the case is eventually filed in that forum. I06
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, an analysis of both
the language and the history of the federal transfer statute indicates
that it is simply not a proper means to enforce forum selection clauses.
Nothing in the language of the transfer statute mentions forum
selection clauses. Additionally, the primary clause of § 1404(a), which
instructs the court on what to consider in its determination, requires
the decision to be based on which forum is more convenient for the
parties and witnesses. 10 7 Though forum selection clauses may reflect
at least one party's belief about convenience at the time of the
agreement, they are not necessarily relevant as to which venue is
actually convenient for both parties and witnesses at the time of
litigation. 08 Moreover, the purpose of § 1404(a) was to codify the
common-law standard of forum non conveniens,'0 9 and that standard
633-34 (explaining that its holding was motivated by the desire to protect the advantages that
may accrue to plaintiffs "who have chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a
proper venue").
106. Of course, many contemporary contracts contain choice-of-law clauses that would
undermine the importance of this distinction. However, these clauses are not bulletproof, so this
risk could remain even despite the existence of such a clause in the contract. See, e.g., Kipin
Indus., Inc. v. Van Deilen Int'l, Inc., 182 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding choice-of-law
clause to be unenforceable as to a particular provision on the theory that the parties were
mistaken to include that clause); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971)
(discussing circumstances under which choice-of-law clauses should not be enforced).
107. See David E. Pearson, Comment, Transfer of Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(A): All
Things to All People, Or, Cracking Under the Weight of the Forum Selection Clause, 75 TEMP. L.
REV. 925, 949-50 (2002) (arguing as a matter of statutory construction that § 1404(a) "permits
transfer to only a more convenient forum" such that a transfer granted "in the interest of justice,
without any added net convenience for the parties and the witnesses, is clearly not sanctioned by
the statute," and citing to the Reviser's Note to § 1404 for support). It is true that the language
"in the interest of justice" in § 1404(a) arguably can be conceived as presenting an additional
consideration for the court (i.e., the first two clauses are disjunctive or conjunctive, rather than
the second clause modifying "may transfer" such that a court may only transfer in the interest of
justice when the forum is not convenient), and it would arguably be in the interest of justice to
enforce such a clause. However, the fact that § 1404(a) was meant to codify forum non
conveniens and that doctrine did not contemplate forum selection clauses still weighs against the
use of § 1404(a), even under such a reading.
108. Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that § 1404(a), which 'looks to the present and future," is not consistent with
"retrospective" determinations that must be made regarding the enforceability of forum selection
clauses, including bargaining power and overreaching at the time the contract was made).
109. See Eric Fahlman, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Should State or Federal Law
Determine Validity in Diversity Actions?-Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.Ct.
2239 (1988), 64 WASH. L. REV. 439, 441-42 (1989) (explaining that the federal transfer statute
"was enacted in 1948 in accordance with the general principles of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens").
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neither contemplated nor was frequently used in enforcing forum
selection clauses. 110
As clearly shown, the motion to transfer under § 1404(a) is a
deeply flawed mechanism to enforce forum selection clauses. The
fundamental flaws with using either the federal transfer statute or
the Rule 12(b) motions to enforce forum selection clauses have
prevented courts from solving the proper-motion problem.
B. Tensions between the Erie and Trans-Procedural Principles
The choice-of-law problem has also proven intractable thus far
due to the collision of two fundamental legal principles. Under the
first principle, the fortuity of diversity of citizenship between parties
should not cause fundamentally different results in litigation.111 This
principle was the driving force behind the Supreme Court's analysis in
Erie1 12 and its progeny.11 3 Under the second principle, the use of
different procedural mechanisms by the parties should not affect the
analysis of those parties' underlying substantive rights.1 14 As the law
currently stands, either one or both of these principles will be violated
in every instance where a defendant seeks to enforce a forum selection
clause in a diversity case."15
110. See id. at 448-49 (arguing that none of the relevant factors a district court must
consider when contemplating a dismissal due to forum non conveniens, set out by the Supreme
Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), indicates that the doctrine relates to forum
selection clauses). Furthermore, the Court's presumption "in favor of plaintiffs choice of forum"
implies that a court applying that doctrine "would not enforce such clauses because they would
interfere with the presumptive right of the plaintiff to choose the forum." Id. at 449.
111. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) (explaining that Erie's policy, "that touches vitally the proper
distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts," is that, for all cases in federal
court due to diversity, "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a
State court").
112. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75-78.
113. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (observing that "the Erie rule is
rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character of result of a litigation
materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court"); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (noting that Erie was a response to the "accident" whereby
"diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
state and federal courts sitting side by side").
114. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 515-
27 (2006) (explaining that Roscoe Pound's criticism of the traditional civil justice system, which
"spark[ed]" the development of the formulation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was
founded in large part upon the principle of the "resolution of cases on their substantive merits").
115. Cf. IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J.) (reasoning that, due to the state of the law, an "arbitrary difference" will
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1. The Erie Principle
Since 1938, it has been black-letter law that federal courts in
diversity cases should apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law. Because the distinction between substance and
procedure is often not easily ascertainable in practice, 116 the Supreme
Court has instructed that this choice-of-law determination must be
made in a way that promotes the so-called "twin aims" of Erie:
discouraging forum shopping and preventing an inequitable
administration of the laws. 117 Underlying Erie is the basic principle
that a controversy's mere satisfaction of the diversity jurisdiction
requirements in federal courts should not cause substantially different
results in the outcomes of litigation.118
Litigation involving forum selection clauses necessarily
implicates the Erie principle. Imagine four companies: A, B, X, and Y.
All the companies but company Y reside in the state of Parochialand,
which has a general policy disfavoring the enforcement of these
clauses. Company Y, however, resides in the state of Freedomland,
which favors these clauses. Company A enters into a contract with
company B, and company X enters into a contract with company Y.
Both contracts contain forum selection clauses selecting the favored
forums of companies B and Y-their respective states of residency." 9
Alleged breaches of each contract occur, and companies A and X file
suit in a Parochialand court. In the A-B dispute, the court will apply
its state policy disfavoring forum selection clauses; accordingly,
litigation will continue in Parochialand. In the X-Y dispute, however,
company Y will have the option of removing to federal court due to
diversity of citizenship.1 20 If the federal court applies federal law,
inevitably be created between either "a federal and a state litigation" or "a dismissal ... and a
transfer" depending on the court's decision as to choice of law).
116. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. For the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1996)
(observing that "[cllassification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' . . . is sometimes a
challenging endeavor" and reasoning that a New York state statute capping damages was in
certain senses both substantive and procedural).
117. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980).
118. Cf. John Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1974)
(explaining that, in the standard account of the Erie doctrine, "Erie is by no means simply a case"
and that it is inadequate "to call it a rule or even a principle, for it implicates, indeed perhaps it
is, the very essence of our federalism").
119. Of course, as companies A and B are located in the same state, their agreement would
not likely specify the forum of a different state, but it might very well specify as the forum a
state court located within a county nearest to company B at the opposing end of their common
state.
120. Assuming the amount in dispute is greater than seventy-five thousand dollars, the
parties fulfill the requirements of the federal diversity statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)
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which views forum selection clauses more favorably than
Parochialand, it will likely enforce the clause. As a result, company X
will be forced to continue litigation in a federal forum in Freedomland.
Thus, the application of federal law to the X-Y dispute would cause
both forum shopping-because company Y will seek removal to federal
court specifically to obtain the benefit of that more favorable federal
law121-and the inequitable administration of the laws, as one
(identically situated) pair of parties will litigate in the plaintiff-
preferred forum and the other pair will litigate in the defendant-
preferred forum.
Despite the fact that applying federal law in such a situation
appears to violate both of the twin aims of Erie, the Supreme Court in
Stewart held that federal law must be applied when a defendant seeks
to enforce a forum selection clause by transfer under § 1404(a). 122
Thus, so long as the defendant may enforce the clause through
transfer and not solely through dismissal,123 the Erie problem persists.
However, in cases where the clause exclusively selects a state or
international forum and the federal transfer motion is therefore
unavailable, the defendant's only option to enforce the clause is a
motion to dismiss. In such cases, the Erie problem could arguably be
resolved by requiring the application of state law to analyze the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.124 If federal courts applied
state law to motions to dismiss, the defendant would have no incentive
to forum shop by removing to federal court because the federal court
would apply the same state-law policy. Similarly, no inequitable
administration of the laws would occur because the same result would
be achieved regardless of whether the parties had access to the federal
forum. Nevertheless, this approach is no silver bullet. While it would
(requiring for diversity jurisdiction that the amount in controversy exceed "the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs").
121. While removal from state to federal court may not constitute the type of vertical forum
shopping that is typically considered in Erie analysis, because it is forum shopping conducted by
the defendant rather than by the plaintiff in the first instance, authority exists that such second-
instance forum shopping is a concern of Erie. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact that "nonresident defendants will be
encouraged to shop for more favorable law by removing to federal court" is a "significant
encouragement to forum shopping [that] is alone sufficient to warrant application of state law").
122. Id. at 28.
123. This is the case so long as the forum selection clause at least arguably selects a federal
forum such that the transfer statute may be invoked. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (allowing for
transfer to "any other district [court] or division," but not to state courts).
124. See, e.g., Robert A. de By, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or
Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1068 (1989) (arguing that "Erie requires
the application of state law" in this situation).
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alleviate the Erie problem, it would also cause direct tension with the
other fundamental principle involved: the trans-procedural principle.
2. The Trans-Procedural Principle
Further complicating forum selection clause jurisprudence is
the other fundamental principle that a party's choice of procedural
mechanism to enforce a substantive right should not affect the
analysis of that underlying right. 125 In other words, cases should be
decided on the merits, not on procedural technicalities. Support for
this principle ranges from comments by the original drafters of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 126 to a recent Supreme Court
decision. 127 For the purpose of brevity, this Note will refer in
shorthand to this concept as the "trans-procedural" principle. This
term derives its name from the trans-substantive principle-a well-
known, analogous concept that procedural rules should not vary based
on the substantive law invoked in the dispute. 128
Because of the current status of the law, the analysis of the
enforceability of forum selection clauses implicates the trans-
procedural principle. Currently, when a defendant in a diversity case
desires to enforce its alleged substantive rights under a forum
selection clause, it can (sometimes) utilize either a motion to
dismiss 129 or a motion to transfer 130 to effectuate those rights. Stewart
commands that the federal standard of § 1404(a) be applied to motions
125. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 114, at 515 (explaining that a foundational principle of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that, for any particular case, "[t]he substantive merits
[shlould determine the outcome").
126. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 297 (1938)
(observing the importance of deciding cases on their merits and cautioning against the tendency
of procedural rules "to assume a too obtrusive place in the attentions of judges and lawyers");
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 557 (2002) ("[he Rules
were designed to encourage determination on the merits."); cf. Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of
Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (recounting that the Rules were motivated in part by a desire for
"courts [to] render judgments based on facts not form").
127. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (reasoning that the
simplified pleading system "was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim").
128. The trans-substantive principle requires that "procedure [be] generalized across
substantive lines" such that it is not just "confined to cases of [a] particular description." Robert
M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718,
718, 725 (1975) (quoting Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 295 (1813) (Marshall,
J.)).
129. More precisely, the defendant can utilize one of various motions to dismiss. See supra
Part II.B.
130. Recall that the defendant can only employ the motion to transfer to enforce the forum
selection clause under 28 U.S.C § 1404(a) if the clause at least arguably selects a federal forum.
See supra note 123.
2009] FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN FEDERAL COURT 1937
to transfer.' 3 ' However, the federal circuits are split over how to
analyze a motion to dismiss-different jurisdictions will apply either
the federal Zapata standard or an applicable state-law policy.132 Thus,
contrary to the trans-procedural principle, the procedural mechanism
employed will indeed affect whether the underlying substantive right
will be enforced.
3. The Current Tension Between the Erie and
Trans-Procedural Principles
Since Stewart, no judicial decision can simultaneously satisfy
both the Erie and trans-procedural principles. 133 Federal law must be
applied when a defendant seeks to enforce the forum selection clause
through transfer in federal court. 134 State law must be applied when
the defendant seeks to enforce such a clause in state court, regardless
of the procedural device employed. However, an open question exists
as to which type of law should apply when the defendant seeks to
enforce the clause through dismissal in a federal court sitting in
diversity. If federal law is applied in that instance, then the principle
that a party's choice of procedural device should not affect its
substantive rights is mostly satisfied: 135 federal law will apply in the
defendant's attempt to enforce the forum selection clause in federal
court, regardless of whether the defendant seeks to enforce this right
through a motion to dismiss or a motion to transfer. However, in such
a situation the Erie principle is completely violated. Courts will apply
federal law regardless of the defendant's choice of transfer or
dismissal, and the plaintiff might lose the protection of its state's laws
due simply to the happenstance of diversity. 136
On the other hand, suppose that the court applies state law
when the defendant seeks to enforce the forum selection clause
through dismissal in a federal court sitting in diversity. This selection
131. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-30 (1988).
132. See supra Part II.C.
133. Cf. IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir.
2006) (Posner, J.) (reasoning that, due to the state of the law, an "arbitrary difference" will
inevitably be created between either "a federal and a state litigation" or "a dismissal ... and a
transfer" depending on the court's decision as to choice of law).
134. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 28-30.
135. Note, though, that a limited problem still exists as to this trans-procedural principle,
because the defendant's choice of motion changes the applicable federal standard to be applied:
Zapata or § 1404(a), which differ somewhat in their ability to enforce that right. See supra Part
II.C (observing that courts have applied different federal standards depending on defendant's
choice of motion).
136. See supra Part III.B (discussing tensions between Erie and trans-procedural principles
and implications for Erie twin-aims resulting from current state of the law).
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minimizes the potential Erie problems because now the plaintiff can
rely on its rights under state law, despite the existence of a diverse
party. 137 However, this selection violates the principle that the choice
of procedure should not alter substantive rights: the enforcement of
the forum selection clause will be analyzed under vastly different laws
depending on whether the defendant seeks to enforce its rights
through a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to transfer. 138 This
example illustrates the continuing tension between these two
principles in forum-selection-clause federal jurisprudence. Because
federal law must be applied to motions to transfer in federal courts
and state law is applied in state courts, the choice of law governing
dismissal in federal courts cannot simultaneously satisfy both the Erie
and trans-procedural principles.
C. The Interconnectivity of the Proper Motion and Choice-of-Law
Problems
While these two circuit splits may at first appear only
tenuously related, they are actually manifestations of the same core
problem: regardless of how they are stretched and manipulated by
judges and the parties, an outdated set of procedural rules cannot
properly cover the modern issue of the enforcement of forum selection
clauses. The proper-motion problem arises because all of the
procedural devices that have been employed to enforce forum selection
clauses are ad hoc devices not properly suited to achieve that end. 139
The choice-of-law problem traces its origins to Stewart, where the
Supreme Court failed to confront the fact that two fundamentally
different procedural devices appeared appropriate to enforce a forum
selection clause.1 40 Thus, both the choice-of-law and proper-motion
problems find their geneses in the fact that neither the procedural
rules nor the Supreme Court in Stewart contemplated the full breadth
of the modern situation posed by forum selection clauses.
137. This will be true at least insofar as the defendant is unwilling or unable to bring a
motion to transfer, which would still be analyzed under federal law due to the accident of diverse
parties because of the Court's holding in Stewart.
138. That is, the court would apply state law as to the enforceability of the clause if the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and it would apply federal law on that question if the
defendant filed a motion to transfer. See supra Part III.B.ii.
139. See supra Part III.A.
140. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (discussing Stewart and the Court's
failure there to consider all possible procedural devices for enforcing forum selection clauses).
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D. A Survey of Potential Judicial Solutions and Their Pitfalls
Though courts and several commentators have proffered
potential solutions to these problems that rely only upon the powers of
the courts, none of these solutions are fully adequate. First, as already
discussed, many courts avoid the choice-of-law problem by reasoning
that no conflict exists because both federal and state law would find
the clause enforceable. 14' Second, one commentator has recently
proposed that federal courts in diversity cases should always analyze
forum selection clauses selecting other federal forums under § 1404(a),
but should analyze clauses selecting state or international forums
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 142 Third, several judges
and at least one other commentator have implied that Stewart was
wrongly decided and should be overruled so that state law will be
applied whenever a defendant seeks to enforce a forum selection
clause in a diversity case.143 Despite each proposal's unique
advantages, none of these proposals provide a satisfactory solution.
1. A Deferred Judicial Determination
The first potential solution-and the one that has been most
commonly employed by the federal circuit courts to date-is a judicial
determination that the clause would be enforced under either state or
federal law.144 Thus, because there is no conflict, a determination on
which law should be applied need not be made. This approach is
obviously best when there is, in fact, no conflict between federal and
state law.' 45 Indeed, it has likely been employed so frequently because
of a belief that state-law policies on forum selection clauses are
converging towards the federal Zapata standard. 146 However, there
141. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
142. Marcus, supra note 27, at 1038.
143. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39-40 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that state law should apply in the analysis of forum selection clauses raised
through motions to transfer); Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians, & Health Care Workers of
N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is strongly
arguable that in a diversity case, the validity of such clauses should be determined by state law.
.. ."); cf. de By, supra note 124, at 104 (arguing that Erie requires the application of state law in
the analysis of the attempt to enforce a forum selection clause under a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to
dismiss).
144. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
145. Such an approach is in alignment with the principle that courts should not decide more
than is necessary to resolve the dispute before them.
146. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1095-96 (1989)
(explaining, in 1989, that "a clear majority of state courts, many influenced by [Zapata], has
adopted this modern theory of party autonomy").
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are two problems with this approach. First, there remain many states
whose policies on forum selection clauses are not substantially
identical to federal law, 147 and there is no reason to believe that all of
those states will adopt the federal policy anytime soon. Thus, merely
avoiding the problem by finding "no conflict" is simply not an option in
these states. Judges applying those states' laws would be
intellectually dishonest if they were to gloss over the actual contours
of state law and assume that they reflected the federal standard.
Second, this approach utterly fails to address the interrelated problem
of which motion should be used to enforce a forum selection clause. It
thus not only allows, but also facilitates, the proper-motion circuit
split and the resulting variations of the rights of the parties.
2. Professor David Marcus's Approach
A second potential solution suggests that federal courts sitting
in diversity conduct their analysis in one of two ways, depending on
whether the forum selection clause at least arguably selects a federal
court. 148 For courts asked to enforce clauses selecting federal courts,
Professor David Marcus's approach advocates that they perform the
analysis set forth in § 1404(a) and enforce the clause through transfer,
regardless of whether the defendant attempted to enforce the clause
through a motion to dismiss or a motion to transfer.149 Because
substantial authority exists that a federal district court may transfer
to another appropriate district court sua sponte,150 courts could
147. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.745(3) (West 2009) (governing when forum
selection clauses are enforced in Michigan); Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537
N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 1995) ("Generally under Iowa law, choice of forum provisions that would
deprive Iowa courts of jurisdiction they would otherwise have are not legally binding in Iowa, but
Iowa courts will consider them as one factor when determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction."); Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Mont. 1998) (holding that
Montana statutes create "strong public policy considerations . .. for voiding choice of forum
provisions"); Map Supply, Inc. v. Integrated Inventory Solutions, LLC, 661 S.E.2d 789 (Table),
No. COA07-733, 2008 WL 2096971, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3
(2007), which governs the enforceability of forum selection clauses in North Carolina); see also
Freer, supra note 146, at 1096 (explaining, in 1989, that "[a]t least a dozen states cling to the
traditional view that [forum selection] clauses are invalid per se," that "[t]hese states encompass
major commercial centers, such as Atlanta, Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston,
Kansas City, and St. Louis," and that, "[w]hile the precedent in some of these states predates the
modern movement, several have recently reaffirmed the traditional approach, expressly rejecting
[Zapata] and embracing the older doctrine").
148. Marcus, supra note 27, at 1038.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Carver v. Knox County, Tenn., 887 F.2d 1287, 1291 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that a district court may transfer a case sua sponte under § 1404(a)); In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717,
721 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The broad language of section 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to
order transfer on its own motion."); Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d
1940 [Vol. 62:6:1913
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perform this analysis even if the defendant only filed a motion to
dismiss. 151 The same analysis could therefore be used whenever a
defendant sought to enforce a clause that selects a federal forum.
For courts that are asked to enforce clauses selecting state or
international forums, this approach advocates that they should
instead analyze whether the clause should be enforced under the
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens. 152 If a court determines
that the clause should be enforced under that standard, it should
accordingly dismiss the case. Because the § 1404(a) and forum non
conveniens standards are quite similar, this approach allows courts to
conduct the same analysis regardless of which procedural device is
employed by the defendant seeking to enforce the clause. 15 3 It also
eliminates the proper-motion problem, as the court merely looks upon
any attempt to enforce the forum selection clause as a trigger to
perform the foregoing analysis.
While this proposal is elegant in its simplicity, fundamental
problems remain. Perhaps most significantly, there does not appear to
be any good reason-aside from the mere existence of the transfer
statute-that the applicable choice-of-law should turn on whether the
forum selection clause chooses a federal court. Under this approach,
when a clause selecting a federal court is enforced, the case will be
transferred to the federal forum, and the choice-of-law rules of the
transferor forum will be applied in the continuing litigation. 154
However, when a clause selecting a state or international court is
Cir. 1979) (noting that § 1404(a) must allow for sua sponte transfer because, "[w]hile § 1404(b)
contains the proviso that transfer may be ordered '(u)pon motion, consent or stipulation of all
parties,' there is no such limitation in § 1404(a)").
151. Indeed, several district courts have suggested or utilized this approach of transferring
sua sponte despite the fact that the defendant had sought to enforce the clause through a motion
to dismiss, perhaps in attempt to circumvent all the problems in this area of the law. See, e.g.,
Licensed Practical Nurses, Technicians, & Health Care Workers of N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises,
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]ransfer pursuant to § 1404(a) may be an
appropriate remedy for effectuating a forum selection clause even when the defendant does not
seek that remedy, but argues for dismissal instead."); Haskel v. FPR Registry, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
909, 915-17 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (transferring from New York to Maryland district court sua sponte
after defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to enforce the clause); Page Constr. Co. v. Perini
Constr., 712 F. Supp. 9, 10-11 (D. R.I. 1989) (deciding to transfer the case from Rhode Island to
Massachusetts district court, even though the defendant moved to dismiss under 12(b)(6)).
152. See Marcus, supra note 27, at 1038 (arguing that courts should apply the procedural
mechanism of forum non conveniens in the analysis of clauses designating state or foreign courts
in nonadmiralty cases); see also Corsico, supra note 77, at 1856 (arguing that federal courts
should analyze the enforcement of all forum selection clauses that select non-federal forums
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
153. See Corsico, supra note 77, at 1877 (reasoning that "the same core doctrine would be
used" if the defendant filed a motion to transfer as if it had filed a motion to dismiss).
154. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639-40 (1964) (holding that the transferee
court must apply the state law of the transferor court when a case is transferred).
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enforced, the case will be dismissed, and any suit that is refiled in the
agreed-upon forum will use the new forum's choice-of-law rules. It
seems neither fair nor appropriate that a determination as crucial to
the parties' rights as anticipating applicable choice-of-law rules should
be determined by whether the parties' forum selection clause selects a
federal forum. 155
Other problems undermine this approach as well. As
previously discussed, § 1404(a) fundamentally does not appear to be
an appropriate vehicle to enforce forum selection clauses. 156 For
similar reasons, the application of forum non conveniens to those
clauses selecting state or international forums is no improvement. 157
Additionally, both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are
discretionary, 158 so their applicability rests in the determination of the
trial judge. However, whether a forum selection clause should be
enforced appears to be more properly considered a mandatory issue.1 59
Moreover, because there is no mandate for judges to adopt this
proposal aside from the persuasive force of its argument, it is unlikely
that it would be uniformly adopted in the federal courts. To the extent
that some courts but not others adopt this proposal, uniformity will be
155. It is very unlikely that, in making the choice of federal or state court in (or the precise
language of) the forum selection clause, the parties realized the potential import of this decision
as to choice of law.
156. See supra Part III.A. The language of § 1404(a) primarily contemplates the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, which is not really relevant to the consideration of these clauses.
Also, it is arguably a codification of forum non conveniens, which also did not contemplate these
clauses.
157. The analysis of whether to dismiss on the grounds of forum non coveniens goes through
factors such as access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process, and cost of obtaining
witnesses, among others. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). There is no
necessary relationship between the satisfaction of these factors and the presence of a forum
selection clause. Moreover, a plaintiffs choice of forum should "rarely be disturbed" under forum
non conveniens "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant." Id. at 508. But courts
clearly believe that forum selection clauses play some significant-if not dispositive- role in the
analysis. See supra Part II.A.
158. Section § 1404(a) states with precatory language that "a district court may transfer," 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis added), and dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens is likewise
only discretionary, see Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429
(2007) (explaining that "[a] federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of forum
non conveniens" (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981)) (emphasis added)).
159. It does not seem that judicial discretion should determine, in instances free from fraud
or overreaching, whether a clause in a contract should be enforced. Similarly, the use of § 1404(a)
transfer to enforce such clauses can affect the availability of appellate review on that
determination of clause enforcement. See IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc.,
437 F.3d 606, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (explaining that "[d]ismissal is appealable,
transfer not"). See generally 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3846 (3d ed. 2009) ("The transfer order is not
subject to anything in the nature of direct review by the transferee court or its court of
appeals.").
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undermined, and the circuit splits will persist. Finally, this proposal
requires courts to apply the § 1404(a) standard when analyzing
attempts to enforce forum selection clauses through motions to
dismiss,160 but the vast majority of circuits that have directly
confronted the question have applied either the federal Zapata
standard or state law. 161 Thus, this proposal would require these
courts to substantially alter their mode of analysis, thereby
abandoning stare decisis.
3. Overruling Stewart: A Judicial Determination That State Law
Applies to Both Motions to Transfer and Motions to Dismiss
A third potential solution would be for the Supreme Court to
overrule Stewart as incorrect in its holding that diversity courts
should apply federal rather than state law to motions to transfer. 6 2
For consistency across motions, this proposal would also require the
judicial determination that state law should apply when a defendant
seeks to enforce a forum selection clause through a motion to dismiss.
This approach would therefore ease the tension between the Erie and
trans-procedural principles: because state law would apply in both
state and federal courts, there would be no incentive for forum
shopping and no potential for an inequitable administration of the
laws. 163 Additionally, because the enforceability of forum selection
clauses would be determined under the same analysis regardless of
whether the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or a motion to
transfer, the parties' underlying substantive rights would not be
determined by the procedural device employed.
This approach, though it would resolve these significant
concerns, has several glaring weaknesses. While overruling Stewart
160. More precisely, this approach requires the application of § 1404(a) for motions to
dismiss when the clause selects a federal forum, and it requires the application of the quite-
similar forum non conveniens standard for motions to dismiss when the clause selects a state or
international forum.
161. See supra Part II.C. It should be noted, though, that some district courts have
conducted the sua sponte transfer. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
162. Though no commentator or court has directly advocated overruling Stewart, the
implication of a dissenting Supreme Court Justice and one prominent district court is that
Stewart was wrongly decided. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under the twin-aims test, I believe state law controls the question of the
validity of a forum-selection clause between the parties."); Licensed Practical Nurses,
Technicians, & Health Care Workers of N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393,
398 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is strongly arguable that in a diversity case, the validity of such clauses
should be determined by state law, which generally governs substantive questions involving the
making and enforcement of contracts.").
163. Cf. supra Part III.B.
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would ease the trans-procedural tension insofar as the same law
would be applied regardless of whether the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss or a motion to transfer, 164 it would do nothing to alleviate the
proper-motion problem. 16 5 If the parties had specified a non-federal
forum (so the defendant could not move for transfer under § 1404),
that defendant would have to determine which motion to dismiss
should be brought. The circuit split would persist. Additionally, this
approach would continue to allow plaintiffs choice-of-law benefits they
had not bargained for. A defendant who successfully transferred the
litigation would find herself subject to the choice-of-law rules of the
plaintiffs initial forum rather than those of the agreed-upon forum. 16 6
This approach would also require overcoming stare decisis: it
would require the Supreme Court to overrule its own holding in
Stewart. Moreover, because this approach would require a
determination by either the Supreme Court or the circuit courts that
state law should apply in the analysis of motions to dismiss, it would
force a substantial change from the current plurality of the circuits
that has held that the federal standard of Zapata must apply to
motions to dismiss. 16 7 Finally, this approach would widen the gap
between diversity cases and federal question or admiralty cases
involving forum selection clauses.
Due to the collision of the Erie and trans-procedural principles
and the lack of any appropriate procedural device for clause
enforcement, courts alone cannot remedy this doctrinal tangle. It is
therefore necessary to look to the legislative branch and the Supreme
Court in its rulemaking capacity for an alternative, more uniform
approach to reconcile this area of the law and solidify the doctrine of
forum selection clause enforcement in federal courts.
164. Cf. supra Part III.B.ii.
165. Cf. supra Part II.B.
166. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. While a sophisticated defendant would
likely bring a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to transfer in this situation-under this
state-law approach, each will be equally likely to be granted, and the motion to dismiss would
prevent the initial forum's choice-of-law rules from carrying into the continuing litigation-the
fundamental problem remains that this inequity could occur, and it likely would occur to less
sophisticated defendants.
167. See supra Part I.C.
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IV. THE UNIFORM SOLUTION: A SINGLE FEDERAL RULE AND FEDERAL
STANDARD
A. A Modified Zapata Approach for Dismissal
The ideal solution to the problems plaguing the law of forum
selection clause enforcement in federal courts is for the Supreme
Court to create a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 168 that is
specifically tailored to enforcing forum selection clauses. 169 As
outdated procedural devices were the geneses of both the proper-
motion and choice-of-law problems,1 70 the optimal way to eliminate
both doctrinal problems is to create a single Federal Rule that would
be defendants' only available means to enforce forum selection clauses
in federal court. This Rule should include language instructing courts
to apply the standard from Zapata with a slight modification.' 71 To
ensure that defendants cease attempts to invoke the federal transfer
statute as well, Congress should simultaneously amend that statute to
indicate that courts must not consider the presence of a forum
selection clause in their transfer analysis.1 72 The combined new
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and amended federal transfer statute
will be referred to hereinafter as the "Modified Zapata Approach."'173
168. Congress delegated the authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
169. At least a few other commentators have recommended a statutory or rule-based solution
to this problem, though none advocate an approach that as thoroughly addresses each of the
problems as does the approach advanced here. See Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection
Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67
WASH. L. REV. 55, 93-111 (1992) (proposing a broad federal statute and even including a draft of
the proposed reform); Lederman, supra note 62, at 426 (proposing a codified motion for the
specific use of enforcing forum selection clauses); Lee, supra note 29, at 690 (proposing a broad
federal statute with its basis in the Federal Arbitration Act).
170. See supra Part IIB.
171. This language would be included in the text of the Rule itself, and the Advisory
Committee Notes could include a discussion indicating that purpose of the language is to codify
the standard of Zapata and end once-and-for-all the circuit splits involving choice of law and
proper motion.
172. While the Rule itself could instruct that it is the sole means available to enforce a forum
selection clause, a possible conflict could occur between this Rule and the transfer statute. This
conflict would not likely arise quickly-defendants would generally appear to prefer using this
Rule over motions to transfer because its modified Zapata standard would result in clause
enforcement more often than the more plaintiff-friendly transfer analysis. However, the potential
for conflict implies that to be prudent the Court should make clear in the transfer statute itself
that it no longer allows consideration of forum selection clauses.
173. Cf. Lederman, supra note 62, at 447 (arguing for the adoption of a "Zapata motion,"
which is in some sense comparable to the Modified Zapata Approach but not elaborated upon in
depth).
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The first prong of this approach is a new Federal Rule itself,
referred to as the "modified Zapata Rule." That Rule would provide a
defendant seeking to enforce a forum selection clause with a clear
basis in the Federal Rules for filing a motion to dismiss. It would be
stated as follows:
A party may assert the following defense by motion: failure to bring a lawsuit relating to
the parties' agreement in the forum required by a forum selection clause existing in that
agreement. A court should enforce a forum selection clause by dismissal unless the
resisting party shows it to be unreasonable under the circumstances, provided that a
court should not enforce a forum selection clause if (1) the court's jurisdiction is
grounded in diversity and (2) the state in which the court resides has declared an
unambiguous policy against the enforcement of such clauses.
1 74
The Rule would thus instruct the court to enforce the clause so long as
the clause was not unreasonable. 175 A key exception would instruct the
court to ignore the clause if the court's jurisdiction was grounded in
diversity, and the state where the court was located had declared an
unambiguous policy against the enforcement of such clauses. 176
Finally, the Federal Rules would require the defendant to bring its
motion to dismiss in its first responsive pleading to avoid waiving its
right to contest the forum. 177 The standard for enforceability would
therefore mimic Zapata,178  with the exception that a clearly
pronounced state policy would prevent clause enforcement in diversity
cases. As part of the Federal Rules, it would be available to defendants
regardless of whether federal jurisdiction was grounded in diversity,
federal question, admiralty, or otherwise.
The second prong is amending the federal transfer statute to
prevent its improper use as an alternative mechanism to enforce
forum selection clauses. To accomplish this effect, 28 U.S.C. § 1404
would be amended to include a subsection (e), which would read:
The district court shall not consider the existence of a forum selection clause in a
contract between the parties in its determination of whether transfer is proper.
174. The Modified Zapata Rule could be codified at Rule 12(b)(8) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to fit in with the other, already-existing motions to dismiss. Indeed, the wording used
in this example would allow it to fit easily into Rule 12(b).
175. This is, of course, the standard of Zapata. See 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) ("[S]uch clauses are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless . . . [they are] unreasonable under the
circumstances.").
176. This exception is necessary both to alleviate the Erie problem-to ensure that plaintiffs
can benefit from firm state policies regardless of diversity of citizenship-and to prevent tension
with the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that federal procedural rules "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
177. This aspect of the rule would likely require an update to Rule 12(h), the waiver rule, to
include Rule 12(b)(8). See FED R. CIv. P. 12(h) (pertaining to waiving and preserving certain
defenses).
178. 407 U.S. at 10.
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This language would make clear both to judges and practitioners that
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is no longer a viable procedural device
to enforce a forum selection clause. Instead, the modified Zapata Rule
would be the one and only enforcement mechanism.
The Modified Zapata Approach solves all of the doctrinal
problems prevalent today in the law of forum selection clause
enforcement in federal courts. First, this approach would end the
circuit split on the proper-motion problem. 179 Because it creates a
single motion that would uniformly be employed to enforce forum
selection clauses, it makes clear which motion must be brought to
enforce these clauses. The Modified Zapata Approach therefore
eliminates the confusion to litigants and courts and the corresponding
administrative costs of determining the proper motion. This motion
would not suffer from the theoretical weaknesses of all the previously
utilized procedural devices.' 80 Also, because the motion would be
waived unless introduced by defendants it in their first responsive
pleadings, the Modified Zapata Approach would not allow defendants
to spring it upon plaintiffs late in the course of litigation.
Additionally, the Modified Zapata Approach, by its connection
to a single standard of federal law, would end the circuit split over the
choice-of-law problem.18' Under Hanna, the Federal Rule has
precedence over any state-law policies regarding forum selection
clauses, 8 2 thereby making clear that federal law must apply.
Furthermore, because the federal transfer statute would no longer
remain as a means for a defendant to enforce a forum selection clause,
there would not be a need to choose between the federal standard
contained in that statute and the federal standard of Zapata. A single,
uniform federal standard would apply in nearly all instances in which
a defendant seeks to enforce a forum selection clause. 8 3
The second virtue of the Modified Zapata Approach is that it
would ease the tension that currently exists between the trans-
procedural and Erie principles. The trans-procedural principle would
be satisfied because there would only be one motion that parties could
use to enforce forum selection clauses. As a result, different
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Cf. supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (holding that, when a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure is in direct collision with a state-law policy, the functioning of the federal rule
must prevail such that federal law must be applied).
183. The limitation to this statement is that, because state law would apply where the state
has declared an unambiguous policy against forum selection clauses, some instances would arise
where the federal standard would not be applied.
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substantive results could not be reached due to the defendant's
mundane selection of a procedural device. The Erie principle would
also be mostly satisfied due to the inclusion of the language that a
forum selection clause must not be enforced when the state in which
the diversity court sits has declared a strong policy against such
clauses. Because of this modification, if the plaintiff resides in a state
with a clearly declared policy against these clauses, courts will not
enforce the clause regardless of whether the case proceeds in state or
federal court. Thus, the accident of diversity would not affect the
enforcement of this fundamental right, and neither forum shopping
nor the inequitable administration of the laws would result.
The third beneficial result of the application of the Modified
Zapata Approach is that it avoids many of the problems that arise
from utilization of the federal transfer statute in enforcing forum
selection clauses.18 4 This approach would prevent defendants and
courts from using § 1404(a) inappropriately to enforce forum selection
clauses. By doing so, the Modified Zapata Approach eliminates the
bifurcation of the analysis of clause enforcement, the unfairness
resulting from how only some defendants may employ a motion to
transfer as a second bite at the apple, and the risk that plaintiffs could
benefit from the choice-of-law rules of a forum other than that agreed
upon.18 5 This approach also prevents inconsequential matters-such
as the procedural device employed by the defendant to enforce the
clause and whether the clause arguably selected a federal forum-
from being determinative of the choice-of-law rules to be applied if the
clause is enforced and litigation is moved to the agreed-upon forum.
The Modified Zapata Approach avoids this arbitrary result by
eliminating the availability of transfer as a means to enforce forum
selection clauses.
The fourth strength of the Modified Zapata Approach is that its
legal standard generally reflects the current state of the law in the
majority of the federal circuits. Like the current majority of the
circuits,18 6 the Modified Zapata Approach employs the Zapata
standard-a presumption that such clauses are enforceable unless
they are unreasonable-as its default standard. Thus, this approach
would allow the vast majority of courts to continue employing a
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. Cf. supra Part III.A.
186. See supra Part 1.C.
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familiar mode of analysis and would therefore result in a relatively
easy transition. 187
While the Modified Zapata Approach does provide a mostly
uniform system for the enforcement of forum selection clauses in
federal courts and eliminates many of the current doctrinal problems,
it does have its own shortcomings. Because this approach involves the
creation of a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and the amendment
of the federal transfer statute, two institutions-the Supreme Court
and Congress-must act in order for this approach to become reality.
As the intrinsic complexities of the legislative process can deter
congressional action even in areas of significant importance, an
approach that would depend only on the inner-workings of the judicial
system for its application would be more efficient, all else equal. 188 But
the congressional action needed here is quite simple: the approach is
boiled down to a few sentences of legislation. Furthermore, the
accomplishment of such quick legislative action would result in
significant decreases in the administrative costs to both the judicial
system and its litigants, so any temporary cost of legislative action
appears outweighed by long-term benefits.
Perhaps the most significant weakness of the Modified Zapata
Approach is that at least a glimmer of the Erie problem remains.
Consider a plaintiff who resides or files in a state with a policy weakly
opposing forum selection clauses. Such a policy would not be
sufficiently unambiguous as to invoke the modified Zapata Rule
exception. Thus, a federal court would not enforce the clause even if a
state court might have enforced it. In this instance, the accident of
diversity could still cause differing results. This unlikely scenario18 9
may invoke some of the concerns of Erie, but it is an inevitable
byproduct of the modified Zapata Rule exception that successfully
alleviates Erie problems in most instances.
187. While the Zapata standard would indeed be modified to require a consideration of state-
law policies and most circuits have not relied upon state law, this would not present too much of
an upheaval because most states do indeed have policies similar enough to Zapata, see supra
note 146 and accompanying text, such that this component of the analysis would not frequently
be invoked.
188. See Corsico, supra note 77, at 1857 n.13 ("Given that many of the problems surrounding
forum selection clauses, including the one addressed in this Comment, have existed for roughly
thirty years, it seems unlikely that either Congress or the Supreme Court will act in the near
future.").
189. Most states have adopted the Zapata presumption of enforceability, and many of the
states with policies opposing forum selection clauses have unambiguous policies against
enforcement. Thus, the state with an ambiguous policy against forum selection clauses appears
to be a rare one. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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A final shortcoming of the Modified Zapata Approach results
from the need for a judicial determination as to whether the relevant
state-law policy against enforcement of forum selection clauses is
unambiguous. Whether a state has declared such an unambiguous
policy may not always be a simple one. States that either disfavor
forum selection clauses only in certain scenarios or that maintain a
lukewarm policy against such clauses present a grey area that could
potentially result in increased litigation over whether the Zapata
modification applies.' 90  However, such states appear rare. 191
Additionally, any change to the status quo-whether legislative or
judicial-will result in litigation, but the threat of that alone should
not deter action. Despite these minor weaknesses, the Modified
Zapata Approach is the optimal way to reconcile all of the problems in
this area of the law.
B. The Modified Zapata Approach Applied
Having explained the mechanics, theoretical foundations, and
strengths and weaknesses of the Modified Zapata Approach, it is next
useful to illustrate how the application of this rule would work in
practice through a few hypothetical scenarios. First, consider again
the hypothetical posed in the Introduction. Carol from North Carolina
had filed suit for breach of contract in North Carolina state court, and
Ricoh desired to enforce the forum selection clause to bring the
litigation to New York. Recall that North Carolina has a strong policy
against such clauses. 192 While the parties satisfy the diversity statute
such that removal to federal court would be proper, Ricoh would not
seek removal merely due to a desire to enforce the clause. This is
because Ricoh would have no greater rights to enforce the clause in
federal court than in state court: it could no longer seek to have the
case transferred to another federal court, and the court would likely
deny its modified Zapata Rule motion because of North Carolina's
unambiguous policy against forum selection clauses. 193 Regardless of
whether the defendant chose to remove to federal court for other
190. Additionally, it is possible that the adoption of such a rule could encourage a type of
race-to-the-bottom behavior, in which all states adopt the same or similar policies disfavoring
forum selection clauses so that their residents would have the same advantages as residents of
states that already have such policies.
191. See supra note 189.
192. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
193. Whether North Carolina has such an unambiguous policy might be the subject of
litigation itself under this approach; thus, it is conceivable that the defendant would remove to
federal court so that it could litigate that exact point in district court and (potentially) upon
appeal.
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reasons, 194 the clause would provide no incentive to remove and would
not be enforced. In this situation, where the current law of forum
selection clause enforcement would create both Erie and trans-
procedural problems, 195 neither forum shopping nor the inequitable
administration of the laws would occur, and the result would not turn
on the procedural device employed.
Consider as well the typical scenario 196 in which the plaintiff
files suit for breach of contract in a state court-other than the court
contractually agreed upon-in a state that does not have a general
policy against forum selection clauses.' 97 In this situation, the
defendant seeking to enforce the forum selection clause must first
consider whether it should remove the case to federal court. However,
in either federal or state court, the same result will be achieved: the
clause will be enforced through dismissal. There is therefore no
incentive for the defendant to forum shop. If the defendant chooses to
remove to federal court and still desires to enforce the clause, it must
then file the modified Zapata Rule motion as its first action in that
court. Neither the court nor the defendant has to struggle with the
question of which Rule 12(b) or § 1404(a) motion is appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similarly, the court will know which standard applies and
whether the motion has been waived, and it will not face the
additional possibility of having to apply both the § 1404(a) and motion
to dismiss standards just to dispose of a single issue. Whether the
clause selected federal, state, or international courts will affect neither
the analysis of whether the clause should be enforced nor the choice-
of-law rules applied to the continuing litigation. In sum, as these
scenarios illustrate, the Modified Zapata Approach presents the best
solution to the problem of forum selection clause enforcement in
federal courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the increasing prevalence of forum selection clauses
and their outcome-determinative impact on litigation, the current
194. Of course, there are many reasons other than forum selection clauses why a defendant
might remove to federal court. However, removal based on those reasons does not implicate the
forum shopping concerns raised in Erie.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. This scenario is most typical, because as noted supra, most states do not currently have
a policy against the enforcement of forum selection clauses. But see supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
197. Continue to assume that the federal diversity statute is satisfied; that is, the parties are
completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
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state of the law of forum selection clause enforcement in federal courts
sitting in diversity contains two circuit splits and numerous other
doctrinal shortcomings. All of these problems stem from a single
source: the use of unsuited and outdated procedural devices and rules
to enforce clauses that only recently have become ubiquitous. Because
no judicial alternative can remedy all of these issues simultaneously,
the law must look to the Supreme Court and Congress for a uniform
approach to forum selection clause enforcement in federal courts.
The creation of a modified Zapata Rule-a new Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure specifically tailored to the pervasive problem of forum
selection clause enforcement-and the amendment of the federal
transfer statute to eliminate its use as a backdoor means for clause
enforcement would result in a much-needed uniform approach. This
approach would be theoretically sound, would eliminate the ongoing
circuit split over which motion is proper to enforce a clause through
dismissal, would eliminate the other circuit split as to whether state
or federal law should apply in this situation, would alleviate existing
Erie problems, and would avoid promoting the procedural mechanisms
used over the parties' substantive rights. Until such action is taken,
the law will continue to create different and arbitrary results between
the Stewarts from Alabama and Carols from North Carolina on a
matter as critical as choice of forum.
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